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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST
OF MARA LEE LONDON.
ROBERT GEARY LONDON and
SANDRA CLEGG LOINDON,
Petitioners and Appellants.

Case No.
10,002

vs.
BARBARA BELL, Guardian ad Litem
for JEANNE BELL,
Objector and Respondent.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
An appeal from an order of the Juvenile Court of the

First District in and for Weber County, Utah.
E. F. ZEIGLER, Judge
DAVID E. BEAN
BEAN AND BEAN
50 North MainJ Street
Layton, Utah
KEITH E. MURRAY

Attorneys for Appellants.

Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
Attorney for Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal by the petitioners-appellants, Robert
Geary London and Sandra Clegg London, from a decree
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and order of the Juventi.le Court of the First District in and
for Weber County, State of Utah, holding that Maralee
London, a minor child now in the care, custody and control
of the petitioners and appellants, is not an abandoned and
deserted child, and ordering the return of said minor
child to the care, custody and control of her natural mother, Jeanne Bell.

DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the judge, and from the finding
that said minor child was not an abandoned and deserted
child and a decree providing for the return of said minor
child to her natural mother, Jeanne Bell, the petitionersappellants bring this appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Petitioners and appellants seek reversal of the decree
of the Juvenile Court and the order returning Maralee
London to her natural mother, Jeanne Bell, on the ground
that said minor was and is now an abandoned and deserted
child, and that it is in the best interest and welfare of said
minor child that the natural mother be permanently deprived of her custody.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The child in question and designated herein as Maralee London was born on the 12th day of February, 1962,
in the State of California, as the natural child of Jeanne
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Bell, \vho at the time of delivery was fourteen years old
(T. 28). Throughout the pregnancy, the natural mother,
Jeanne Bell, and her mother, Barbara Bell, discussed with
their family doctor the possibility and desirabiliy of placing the child for adoption (T. 22-23). The natural mother
claims to know who the natural father is, but no marriage
was planned, and the natural mother and her guardian
made no plans to provide a home for the baby (T. 17, 20,
10, 39). Petitioners-appellants were interested in adopting
a child and were advised by relatives to contact Genevive
~teierstein and Dr. Morris, who worked with her in the
placing of children for adoption (T. 76, 77). Petitionersappellants were then advised on the 12th day of FebruarY,
1962, that the baby they had been waiting for had been
born and that they should go to California, and on the 13th
day of February, 1962, they went to the hospital to see the
baby (T. 69). At the specific request of the natural mother,
Jeanne Bell, and her guardian, Barbara Bell, petitioners
were introduced to Jeanne Bell in her hospital room on
the 14th day of February, 1962 (T. 5). At that time petitioners presented to Jeanne Bell a document purporting to
be a preliminary consent for adoption (Exh. 1), which
reads as follows:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

My name is Jeanne Bell, and I reside at Sunland,
County of Los Angeles, State of California. I gave
birth to a child on February 12, 1962, in Burbank
Community Hospital in the City of Burbank, State
of California, for the deilvery of this child. The
father of this child is unknown.
I have been informed that a Mr. Robert Geary LonSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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don and ~andra London, his wife, residing at Roy,
Utah, desire to adopt the child. They have come to
Los Angeles immediately after being notified of its
birth for the purpose of taking the child back to
Roy, Utah. I believe that Mr. and Mrs. London
would be good parents and would give my child
proper care, support, and education. They have one
child in their family, and I believe that this child
would add much joy and happiness to their lives
and that this arrangement is desirable for all parties
concerned.
It is my expectation to deliver the child into their
custody as soon as practical after its birth, with the
un derstanding that they will take the child to their
home in Roy, Utah, and will institute adoption
proceedings there shortly after they arrive home.
I understand, however, that under the Utah law,
the petition for adoption cannot be granted until
after the child has lived with the adopting parents
for at least one year.
1

I also understand that the adoption cannot be completed without my written consent, and that no
other consent than mine is necessary as I am unmarried. It is my present intention to sign such
consent when presented to me by the appropriate
authority.
I do not expect and will not accept any payment or
other consideration for agreeing to this adoption
or for giving such consent. I am informed, however, that Mr. and Mrs. London inttend to pay for
my doctor and hospital bills in connection with the
birth of the child upon the basis that if they had a
natural child of their own at the time, they would
be put to that expense.
The entire adoption procedure and the legal rights
and liabilities which arsie from it are thoroughly
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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understood by me, and in particular the fact that
after the adoption I shall have no rights of any kind
to custody or visitation and that the child from
the time of the adoption shall be legally in the relationship of a total stranger to me, and I shall
have no more right in respect to it than it would
to a strange or unrelated child. I have also been inl..
formed and understand that this statement is purely a statement of my present intention and that I
have the legal right to refuse to sign my consent to
the adoption when it is presented to me. I do now
fully intend, however, to cooperate in every way in
completing the proposed adoption above outlined.
Dated this 14th day of February, 1962, at Burbank,
California.
(s) Jeanne Bell
(s) Mrs. Barbara Bell
(Notary clause)
The natural mother, Jeanne Bell, and her guardian, Barbara Bell, signed the document only after having read it
and only after a paragraph or clause was explained to
them by Genevive Meierstein (T. 10, Meierstein Dep. 11).
l.,he guardian, Barbara Bell, who is also objector-respondent. not only concurred in, but encouraged the foregoing
proceeding (T. 10, 37-39). For approximately ten monlths
petitioners-appeallants proceeded to become parents,
guardians, and family to this infant (T. 92), and without
knowledge of any problems in California, filed their petition for adoption and obtained an order appointing a commissioner to take the consent of the natural mother (T. 94,
100: Exh. 8). On that same afternoon of November 21,
1962, the natural mother, Jeanne Bell, mailed an envelope
addressed to counsel for petitioners-appellants containing
exhibits 2 and 3, requesting that the minor child be re-
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turned to her (T. 32, Exh. 8). The petition for adoption
had already been filed, and appellants refused to deliver
the baby to the objector-respondent. On the 28th day of
January, 1963, an order dismising the petition! for adoption
v.rithout prejudice was signed and entered, the objector-respondent having retained counsel in Ogden, Utah. On or
about the 22nd day of March, 1963, a petition was filed in
the J uvenlile Court of the First District in and forr Weber
County, alleging that Maralee London was an abandoned
and deserted child and that the natural mother, Jeanne
Bell, was not a fit and proper person for the care, custody
and control of said minor child. From an adverse ruling
of the Juvenile Court this appeal is brought. However, the
decree also provided that the temporary custody and control of the said Maralee London should remain with petitioners-appellants should the decision of the Juvenile Court
be appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, and
said minor child is presently residing with petitioners.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
MARALEE L.QNDON WAS AN ABANDONED AND
DESERTED CHILD, AND THE JUVENILE COURT
ERRED IN FAILING TO SO HOLD.
The Juvenile Court has broad and comprehensive latitude and discretion in determining custody of a child, and
it may order that the natural parent be permanently deprived of custody and that the child be placed in a family
for adoption without consent of the parent. Devereaux v.
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Brown. 2 U.2d 334, 273 P.2d 185. Where parents are perma-

nently deprived of child custody, their parental rights are
terminated, and consent to proposed adoption is unnecessary. Jacob v. State Public Welfare Commission, 7 U.2d
304, 323 P.2d 720, U.C.A. 5·5-10-32.
The Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-30-4, 5,
provides for adoption without the consent of the natural
parents based upon a finding that said child was deserted
by its natural parents. Also, under the provisions of 5510-30, U.C.A., the Juvenile Court has the power and the
duty to determine whether or not a child has been neglected or deserted; and further, under sub-section (4) the court
has the power to place the child in the custody of a guardian other than the child's natural parents. A neglected
child is defined at 55-10-6, U.C.A., as follows:
A child who is abandoned by his parent, guardian,
or custodian. A child who lacks proper parental
care by reason of the fault or habits of the parent,
guardian, or custodian. A child whose parent,
guardian, or custodian neglects or refuses to pr~
vide proper or necessary subsistence, education,
medical or surgical care or other care necessary for
his health, morals or well-being.
From the very beginning of her pregnancY, Jeanne
Bell and her mother discussed with Dr. Ralph Sloan:e the
fact that this child was to be placed for adoption (Sloan
Dep. 25, 33). They knew that arrangements for adoption
were being made early in the pregnancy by Dr. Clifford J.
Morris (T. 46). They had ample time to seek legal counsel
and to determine what procedure would be in the best inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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terest of the minor child. When the preliminary consent for
adoption was presented in that hospital room, Jeanne Bell
and her mother read the document, asked questions about
it, and then signed it before Marian P. Kringle, a Notary
Public. Their intent at the time they signed that document
is beyond dispute, and the testimony of Barbara Bell at
the hearing shows a complete change of attitude on her
part as follows:
Q. You state in your letter, Exhibit No. 3, that
you are willing to support your daughter in her
attempt to regain custody of this child, but at the
time this child was born and during the pregnancy,
apparently you were not willing to support her and
her desires at that time, is this correct?

A. Well, it was, but that wasn't really the
reason. I think I was trying to get my little girl
back like she was before and forget about it, because she was just thirteen when it happened, and
fourteen! when she had her baby, and a girl can
grow up an awful lot at thirteen, fourteen and fifteen. She will be fifteen in June. All this happened
in a three-year period, and the baby is still only
thirteen months old now. She has developed from
a thirteen-year-old girl to a young womanr. I feel
she can care for it now where before I didn't.
And again, at page 45:
Now did you have this same belief at the
time you signed Exhibit No. 17.
Q.

A. I am sure I didn't think about it. In fact,
I hadn't thought about it until actually at the time
I didn't think about it. The situation was pretty
bad. I believe I felt at the time that because of her
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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youth, of her age at the time the baby was born,
that was the big factor. If she had been older she
would have had a life of her own. At that time she
would have been old enough to know what she
wanted and asserted her own rights, and otherwise
I would have had an altogether different attitude
if she had been older.
The natural mother, Jeanne Bell, gives a little different
view of her attitude at Page 4 of the Transcript:
At the time that these discussions were
had, did you advise anlYone of your intent to place
the baby out for adoption?
Q.

A. You mean, did I tell anyone I would have
the baby adopted?
Q. Yes.

A. The doctor thought I should place the baby
with the Londons.
Q. Now was this be£ore the birth of the baby?

A. Yes.
Q. Did you advise anyone besides your doctor?

A. We didn't talk about it at home. We were
planning to leave it up to the doctor.
Q. Were any provisions made for keeping the
baby at the time of its birth?

A. No.
Q. None whatsoever?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A. My mother had made none, but I was planning on keeping it and fighting to ge my baby back
when I could, and as far as I knew I had no legal
way then of keeping it, so I planned someday I
would try and get it back if I could.
And again, at page 7:
Q. So what You are saying, Miss Bell, in effect,

is at the time this happened, the Londons happened
to be a convenient vehicle for someone to take your
baby until such time (as) you wanted it back, is
this correct?
A. No, that isn't. I wanted my baby, but what
I really planned to do was think it over, but like
I say, I was young and I really didn't realize actually what I was doing. It was right at that time
everyone was trying to make my decisions for me
and running my life for me, and that I didn't have
a mind of my own, and I guess I wasn't in a position to go on my own.
Q. You feel now at fourteen months later that

this position has completely changed. Is this correct?
A. Yes, I do. I feel like I can make arrangements for its care, and I have more faith. I know
what some of :my legal rights are now.
'rhe Londons received the baby from the hospital staff on
the 15th day of February, 1962, and from that date until
the 26th day of November, 1962, there was not even an
inquiry made to the Londons or to their counsel by the
natural mother, and even after Exhibits 2 and 3 were
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mailed. no legal steps were taken by the natural mother
to obtain the custody of her child. Petitioners-appellants
were the ones who filed a petition in the Juvenile Court
to bring the matter to a conclusion.
Abandonment of a child as ground for adoption without parental consent imports any conduct of a natural
parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.
Shumway v. Farley, 68 Ariz. 159, 203 P.2d 507. As was
stated at In re Potter, 149 P. page 23 at page 24:
Abandonment does not necessarily mean that a
parent has no interest in the child's welfare, it
means rather a withdrawal or neglect of parental
duties. It means a withholding of care and protection, of sympathy and affection.
In the case of Harrison v. Harker, 142, P. 716, the
court in a split decision returned the child to its natural
parents, but two comments illustrate the case at bar perfectly. At page 736 it is said:
Since you have abandoned the child or otherwise
voluntarily divested Yourself of its custody and
permitted others to provide it with a home, maintain, clothe, feed and care for it as their own, the
child's interest and not your desires or your mere
naked legal rights shall control and direct the discretion of the court in the premises.
And again. at page 741, the court stated:
Suppose the mother should again meet with misfortune such as in her judgment would justify her
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to abandon the child, would she not again abandon
it precisely as she did to further her own welfare.
In the present case the natural mother, Jeanne Bell, did
have a change of heart after the first hearing, as expressed
in her letter of April22, 1963, marked Exhibit 9, as follows:
Dear Mr. Murray: I am writing in regards to a custody case you are representing me in.
Because of personal problems, I am very sorry to
tell you I have decided to discontinue trying to get
my child back. When I am eighteen I plan to repay
my mother the money she has spent for this. I can't
tell you how sorrY I am. I don't want to do this,
but I have no other choice.
If you have any fee unpaid, you will be paid. I'm
so sorry I wasted your time, but it is impossible for
me to continue.
Please write me if you have any question. I'm very,
very sorry.
Sincerely,
(s) Jeanne Bell
The foregoing letter was never mailed to Mr. Murray, but
instead was handed to Robert Geary London at Los Angeles, California.
In Kurtz, v. Christensen, 209 P. 340, 1922, a Utah case,
the court found that the natural mother voluntarily pernlitted her doctor to place the child for adoption. Thereafter, the natural mother married the child's father, and
in a habeas corpus proceeding the court found that the naSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tural mother had abandoned her child, and the decision
was affirmed on appeal. The court in upholding the decision of Hummel v. Parrish, 43 U. 373, 134 P. 898, quoted
at page 344:
Though the presumption is that it is for the best
interest of the child and society that it remain with
its natural parents during minority (nevertheless)
where a parent has surrendered her child to others
in infancY and it has been allowed to remain with
others until new ties of mutual affection are formed,
the child's welfare will control the parents' rights
in habeas corpus proceedings for its return.
Jensen v. Early, reported at 228 P. 217, is a Utah case

decided in 1924 with facts very similar to the case now
before the court. In that case the natural mother was three
years older than the n1atural mother in this present case.
In the Jensen case demand was made for the child six
months after its birth, and in the case at bar, ten months
after birth. In the Jensen case the natural mother reached
her majority under the law within six months after the
child was born; in the present case, the natural mother,
Jeanne Bell, is now sixteen years of age and has not seen
her child since the 14th day of February, 1962. In the
Jensen case the district court found that there had been
an abandonment, but the decision! was reversed by the Supreme Court holding that there had been no abandonment.
Abandonment was there defined as follows:
Abandonment in such cases, ordinarily means that
the parent has placed the child on some doorstep
or left it in some convenient place in the hope that
someone will find it and take charge of it, or has
abandoned it entirely to chance or to fate. To make
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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arrangements beforehand with some proper and
competent person to have the care and the custody
of the child it not an abandonment of it as that term
is ordinarily understood.
In the recent case of Wilson v. Pierce, 14 U.2d 317,
383 P. 2d 925, the natural mother was a married woman
whose expected child was fathered by someone other than
her husband. She was anxious for the expected child to be
\Vell taken care of in an adequate home, and after failing
to place the child with a family in Texas, succeeded in
placing her expected child with an Ogden, Utah, couple under an agreement much less comprehensive than Exhibit
1 in the present case. In the following twenty-four months
1\Irs. Pierce kept in contact with the Wilsons, and on one
occasion even visited her natural daughter. However, the
Wilsons took no steps toward adoption until the natural
mother requested the return of her child two years later.
The same types of defenses were interposed there as in the
case presently before the court. In affirming an order of
the district court granting the adoption based on abandonlnent, the court said, at page 927:
The significant fact here is that the adoption is not
grounded upon the written consent as such. Section
78-30-5 U.C.A. 1953, provides that a deserted child
may be adopted without the consent of its parents.
This is a practical necessity which the law wisely
recognizes for the relief of children who might be
abandoned to a worse fate than being so rescued.
In the interest of encouraging rescue and care of
children left without parental refuge, it is not the
policy of the law to impose undue hazards upon
people disposed to come to their aid by leaving
1
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them at the mercy of the whim or caprice of a natural parent who has abandoned his child.
In referring to the definition of abandonment given in the
Jensen case, the court further stated, at page 928:
We see no reason for disagreement with the lan~
guage as applied to the particular fact situations.
But it was not meant to prevent a finding of the
true facts where there has been an actual desertion
or abandonment. A distinction should be made between leaving a child under circumstances which
show a continuing intention to fulfill the duties of
parenthood by seeing to it that the child is cared for
and of possibly resuming such responsibility if that
becomes necessary; as distinguished from an intent
to completely and permanently abandon a child
and parental responsibilities to it where there is in
fact the latter type of abandonment, it matters not
whether it is to a situation where others may be expected to care for the child, or it is left to the mere
chance of whatever fate might befall it. Whether
there has been such an abandonment and what is
to be done with the child depends upon the facts
and circumstances of each case.
Maralee London is now two years old. She has never
lived with her natural mother, and the only parents she
knows are the petitioners-appellants. The court, in quoting from the Kurtz case, once again affirmed the principle
that the best interest of the child is always the principal
concern. Here, as in that case, Maralee London knows no
other parents, and the present wholesome relationship existing between petitioners-appellants and said minor child
should not be ignored.
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In its Memorandum Decision, the Juvenile Court
pointed out two determining factors basic to the legal concept of abandonment (Record, p. 16). The court first came
to grips with the significance of Exhibit No. 1, but disnlissed its evidentiary value based on' Jeanne Bell's youth.
Section 224 of the California Civil Code provides that
the consent of the natural mother of an illegitimate child
is the only consent necessary for the adoption of said child.
Section 226 further provides:
A parent who is a minor shall have the right to
sign a consent for the adoption of his or her child,
and such consent shall not be subject to revocation
by reason of such minority.
It would then appear a fortiori that a minor who abandons
her child is not less gulity of abandonment by reason of her
youth and minority. The doctrine of abandonment is not
balm for the wounds of an erring mother, but rather for
the protection of an infant child whose individual rights
and survival depend upon society offering protection
\Vhere those individually responsible have failed to do so.
Petitioners-appellants therefore contend that the Juvenile
Court minconstrued the evidentiary value of Exhibit 1 and
gave great weight to the youth of the natural mother at
the time of the signing.
The second factor influencing the decision of the Juvenile Court was the elapsed time of ten months between
the signing of Exhibit 1 and the deman(f for the return of
the child to the natural mother. The court then stated
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(Record, p. 16): "This lapse of time, without more, would
not be decisive," and the case of Taylor v. Waddoups, 241
P.2d 157 (1952) is quoted as supporting that proposition.
However, in the next paragraph of the Memorandum Decision and on the same page, the Juvenile Court stated,
•·The Taylor case can, however, be distingushed successfullY from the one at bar on its facts."
Jeanne Bell's testimony at the hearing shows that
there was much more than just an elapsed time of ten
months, and the testimony of Dr. Sloane taken by deposition shows that there is much more to Jeanne Bell than
the mature sophistication she presents in the courtroom.
Jeanne Bell's own testimony shows that she knew
\vhat she was doing when she signed Exhibit 1 (T. 16, 17):
Q. Would you identify for us Exhibit No. 5?

A. Yes, that is a letter I wrote the Londons.
Q. You state in that letter, do you not, Miss
Bell, that at the time this transaction took place in
California you didn't really know what was going
on, is that correct?

A. I wasn't fully aware of everything, like I
told you before.
Q. Well, but you did understand, Miss Bell,

that you were abandoning the care, custody and the
oontrol of this child, did you not? You knew this?
A. I knew that I had a year to make up
mind, after I signed the papers.
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Q. You knew that the intention of the Londons
was to pursue this didn't you? You knew that's
w~at they were. there for, and you knew that by so
doing at that time that you were abandoning the
role of the mother over this child, didn't you?

A. Well, yes.
Q. You were conscious of this in the hospital,
weren't you?

A. Well.
Q. You knew that the people were down there
from Utah and that they intended to take the baby
back, isn't that corect? And you knew that by so
doing that your role as a mother would be nil with
respect to this child while it was in their care, custody and control. Is this true?

A. Yes.
As was said in In reAdoption of Cannon, 243 Iowa 828, 53
N.W.2d 877:
Neither objector here pays any attention to the
question of the child's interest. They both stand
apparently upon the naked, legal proposition that a
parent may encourage and give written consent to
an adoption and thereafter, before the adoption is
fully consummated, arbitrarily change his mind
and, without stating anY reason, figuratively speaking, "pull the rug from under" petitioner, court,
and child, and prevent consummation. Such interpretation of our statutes is unthinkable.
l\ leading case in this area with facts almost identical to
the case now before the court is In re Holman's Adoption,
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so Ariz. 201, 295 P.2d 372. There the natural mother
\vas a minor, age 16, and deserted by her husband at the
time the baby was born. She signed a consent to adoption
knowing full well that the adoptive parents intended to
move to California. The consent she signed apparently had
a clause relating to the one-year period before final consent, as in the case before the court, and the defenses
raised by the natural mother are exactly the same defenses
as have been raised by the respondent here. After extensive review of the cases and authorities, some of which
t.ave been quoted in this brief, the court stated :

* * * We hold that a consent once givenJ by the parent or other persons having the authority to give
such consent may not be revoked after the child
has been placed in the possession of the adoptive
parents, except for legal cause shown, as where
such consent was procured through fraud, undue
influence, coercion, or other improper methods.
In Ex parte Schultz, 181 P.2d 585, the court, after a thorough review of authorities and cases dealing with the subject of revocation of consent, stated at page 586:
Conversely, many tribunals have denied the right
to revoke, and base such denials on (1) principles of
contract; (2) estoppel or other equitable grounds;
(3) public policy favoring adoption1 of children, particularly illegitimate children, or (4) the welfare of
the child as apparent from the facts.
In In re Adoption of n__ , 252 P.2d 223, our court
had the occasion to pass upon the question, of withdrawal
of consent as required by our statute. The child was two
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years old when placed for adoption by someone other than
the natural mother. However, the natural mother appeared
in open court and gave her consent, but then ten months
later withdrew her consent before the adoption was completed. While the facts are not exactlY similar to the case
before the court, the court's acceptance of the principles
stated in the Schultz case and the comments made thereon
are equally applicable to the present case. The court stated, at page ____ :
It would not be surprising that people who desire to
adopt children may actually have greater affection
for an adopted baby than a natural parent who
might have designedly or even by misadventure
happened to become a parent to a child who may
not have been particularly wanted and may present
some unplanned-for difficulties * * * Viewed in that
light, there certainly have intervened "vested
rights," and respondents have, in reliance upon representations made, placed themselves in a different
position, the undoing of which would cause them
irreparable injury in the most real sense. Appellant not only stood by and knowingly permitted, but
actually encouraged such circumstances to eventuate, and further, formally executed the consent
to adoption. Under such facts, she should in equity
and good conscience be estopped to assert her rights
to custodY.
When a parent has failed to give the child the attention and love normally to be expected, has abandoned its care to others, and by irresponsible conduct shown an unvvillingness or inability to
measure up to parental responsibilities, these matters may be taken into consideration by the court
in connection with other factors in determining the
right to custody.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
Once a child has been cast adrift and is without responsible parental care, the policy of the law should
be to assist in every way in establishing a sa tisfactory parent-child and family relationship. Adoptive
parents should not be discouraged by construction
of the law which would cause them to fear the consequences of accepting a child because of the knowledge that the fate of their efforts v,rould be at the
will of the natural parent.
The same sentiments were expressed in the case of In re
..4doption of a Minor, 144 F. 2d, page 650:
It is apparent that if in particular cases the unstable whims and fancies of natural mothers were
permitted, first, to put in motion all the flow of
parental love and expenditure of time, energy and
money which is involved in adoption, and then, as
casually, put the whole process in reverse, the
major purpose of the statute would be largely defeated. * * * A premium would, instead, be put
upon the emotional instability which produces illegitimates; ot say nothing of the possibilities for
racketeering which such an interpretation of the
law would put in reach of those who may be criminal in their tendencies as well as lacking in the
qualities of parenthood.
Though Jeanne Bell has stoutly denied her intention to
take money for this child, her continual harrassmentt of
Dr. Sloane, as stated in his deposition, and the belief of Dr.
Morris that Jeanne Bell called him and offered to settle the
matter for $500.00 represents the possible fruition of the
fears expressed by Judge Miller in the above-quoted case
(Morris Dep. 10, 11).
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In In re Maxwell's Adoption, 176 N.Y.S.2d, 281, a married woman became pregnant by a man who was not her
husband, told her obstetrician to place the baby for adoption. She left the hospital and was not heard from until
the adoptive parents commenced adoption proceedings
\vherein the natural mother was asked to participate, at
vv hich time she revoked her consent to such proceedings
and requested the return of her child. At page 283, the
court stated:

The mother did not, it is true, leave her child
on a doorstep, but surely an abandonment may be
established by proof of conduct less drastic than
that. Just as plainly the settled purpose to be rid
of all parental obigations and forego all parental
rights spells out abandonment under Section III.

POINT II
THE NATURAL MOTHER IS NOT A FIT AND
PROPER PERSON FOR THE CARE, CUSTODY AND
CONTROL OF SAID MINOR CHILD.
From the testimony given at the hearing, the Juvenile Court concluded that Jeanne Bell was mature enough
to care for this minor child, and with this conclusion we
find ourselves in partial agreement. But the maturity exhibited by Jeanne Bell is a sophistication born of experience, rare in a girl of her age. When interrogated by the
court relative to the cost of rearing a minor child her attitude was that of sheer guess, and her answer so indicated;
v...hen asked questions concerning the population of her
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immediate community, she couldn't even given an estimate
(T. 28, 29). Nowhere in the transcript is there evidence
of the type of maturity the court states, and one can only
conclude that it was an observable maturity except for the
testimony of Dr. Clarence Doxey Swanner, who testified
that Jeanne Bell "is quite mature" and that "she is as mature as a fifteen-year-old could be." Dr. Swanner's testitnony was otherwise absolutely neutral, as shown in pages
101 to 104 of the Transcript. The record is otherwise devoid of any other indication that Jeanne Bell's maturity
level is any greater than the average fifteen-year-old. She
is intelligent and she is sophisticated, but these qualities do
not weigh heavily in her favor as an adequate mother and
a fit and proper person for the custody and control of a
minor child.
On the contrary, the record shows that Jeanne Bell
is emotionally immature. At page 7 of the Transcript she
affirms her faith in her ability to care for this child. Her
faith is based on a new religious affiliation cultivated since
the minor child was placed with the Londons (T. 31). She
also received legal counsel in the State of California and
retained counsel to represent her in Utah. Her own attorney in California told her she didn't know what she was
doing, and that she was being foolish (T. 26). Her composure at the hearing was unique in a girl of fifteen years.
Yet, when Jeanne Bell was unhappy with her mother and
an argument developed over the money being spent in the
proceedings in Utah, she immediately penned a letter to
her attorney advising him not to continue the matter and
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that she was discontinuing her attempt to regain the custody of her natural-born child.
At the hearing Jeanne Bell represented to the court
that when Exhibit I was presented to her, she did not know
some of her rights, and that she should have been1 advised
on some points respecting the adoption of this child (T.
7. 8). Her allegation is that she should have been allowed
to discuss the matter with members of her family but the
fact of the matter is that all of the members of her family
were in her hospital room at the time the document was
signed, and she had more than ample opportunity to dis,..
cuss it with her family prior to the birth of the baby, but
admitted that the subject was not discussed in her household (T. 11).
A page 4 of the Transcript, Jeanne Bell states in nouncertain terms that all along she was secretly planning on
keeping her child and fighting to get it back at some future
date, and then at page 14 the following is recorded.
Q. When did you first discover, Miss Bell that
you did not attend to have this baby remain with
the Londons?

A. Three weeks or a month later.
Q. Did you discuss this with your mother?

A. Well. I wanted to, but I was kind of reluctant to.
Q. At any time did she consent to your obtaining this child back during these discussions?
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A. Not at first, but later when she knew I really wanted the baby back she did.
And again, on page 15:
Q. Yes. Is this true between the time you signed

Exhibit 1 and the time that Exxhibits 2 and 3 were
sent to me, you made no inquiry concerning this
child. Is that correct? To me or to the Londons?
A. Oh no, I called my doctor.
Q. But made no inquiries to me or to the

Londons?
A. As I say, I did not know my rights, and I
couldn't contact them.
Q. Isn't it true that a copy of Exhibit 1 was left
with you? You had a copy all the time, and on that
copy it said "Bean and Bean" on the bottom, "Layton, Utah," does it not?

A. Yes.
Q. So this was in your possession all the time,
is this correct?

A. Yes, that is correct.
The first indication that things were not going well in
California came by way of Exhibits 2 and 3 addressed to
counsel for petitioners-appellants. Jeanne Bell had counsel's address right on her copy of Exhibit 1, but for a tenmonth period she made no attempt to contact petitionE'rs-appellants or their counsel to make known her
dissatisfaction.
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Jeanne Bell and her mother, Barbara Bell, were actually fraudulent in their representation1s to the Londons at
the time the baby was placed for adoption. Exhibit 1, set
forth in full in the Statement of F1acts, was the agreement
8igned by Jeanne Bell and her mother, Barbara Bell, and
states the father of the child in unknown but in fact
Jeanne Bell did know the name of the natural father, and
so did her mother (T. 17). In fact, it was Jeanne Bell's represenatiton at the hearing that the baby was born as the
result of a rape committeed upon her by the natural father,
Johnny Wright. She told her mother this and her mother
told the doctor. Apparently Barbara Bell was not advised
of this when it occurred, because she was so shocked when
she discovered that her daughter was pregnant (T. 22, 40).
No criminal action was ever brought against Mr. Wright,
and Jeanne Bell and lVIr. Wright had conversations after
the child was placed with petitioners-appellants (T. 21, 22;
see also Sloan Dep. 8, 12, 13, and Drennen Dep.)
1
,

POINT III
IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST AND WELFARE
OF SAID MINOR CHILD THAT SHE REMAIN WITH
PETITIONERS, AND THAT THEY BE ALLOWED TO
PROCEED WITH ADOPTION.
This child is a happy, well adjusted, normal two-yearold girl, with a place in a family that belongs to her. After
two years of love and affection and the giving of herself
in response to the attention, surroundings, and atmosphere
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of the London home, this infant child has some rights to

he considered. At the time of her birth she was totally rejected by her natural mother, and Barbara Bell refused
the responsibility for her care. With an abundance of love,
the pPtitioners at that very instant were willing to provide
something that the natural mother and Barbara Bell were
not prepared to provide, to wit: An acceptance of the baby
for what she was, and not for what she represented the
natural mother to be. The situation has not materially
changed from the date the child was born. Jeanne Bell is
an unmarried female, age 16. She has two more years of
high school and no immediate prospects of marriage and
the establishment of a home of her own. The transcript is
replete with evidence that Mrs. Bell can no longer control
her adopted daughter, and that in fact she conforms her
views to those expressed by Jeanne Bell (T. 55, 56). That
there is contention in the home concerning finances and
the possible position this child would have in the home is
amply demonstrated by the testimony of Jeanne Bell concerning the letter she wrote to her attorney, which was
never mailed (T. 110, 111 ).
In the findings of fact supporting the decision of the
Juvenile Court, paragraph 7 states that "Barbara Bell has
promised to support both the mother and said child and aid
in caring for said child until the mother has obtained her
education and is emancipated" (R. 13). After nine months
of pregnancy, Barbara Bell had a wonderful opportunity
to take this infant child to her heart and to her home and
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fused to do so. In the words of Jeanne Bell at page 10 of
the transcript:
Yes, she told me to sign it, that I was too young to
take care of it and the responsibility, that she
couldn't take on the responsibility either.
The Londons were willing to take that responsibility with
no questions asked, and they committeed all of their resources to the welfare and happiness of that infant child
when those who had the primary responsibility refused to
do so.

CONCLUSION
A consideration of the background and home life presently enjoyed by his minor child, as contrasted with that
which the natural mother could provide is undoubtedly a
major consideration, and in view of the fact situation presented, the child certainly is entitled to the stability and
love evident in the appellant's home.
The element of contract and representation, and
change of position based on the representations. are pres-ent in this case beyond any doubt, and abandonment is
clear.
We therefore respectfully submit that the decree of
the Juvenile Court should be reversed, and the minor child
should be left in the custody of petitioners-appellants preparatory to adoption, and the natural mother should be
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rermanently deprived of the custody and control of Maralee London, a minor.

Respectfully submitted,
DAVID E. BEAN
Bean and Bean
50 North Main Street
Layton, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants
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